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ABSTRACT 
Packetised telemetry, combined with low station 
coverage for close-earth satellites, may introduce 
new problems in presenting to the operator a clear 
picture of what the spacecraft is doing. A recent 
ESOC study has gone some way to show, by 
means of a practical demonstration, how the use of 
subsystem models combined with artificial 
intelligence techniques, within a real-time 
spacecraft control system (SCS), can help to 
overcome these problems. A spin-off from using 
these techniques can be an improvement in the 
reliability of the TM limit-checking function, as 
well as the telecommand verification function, of 
the (SCS). The paper describes the problem, how 
it was addressed in the study, including an 
overview of the "AMF Expert System" prototype, 
and proposes further work which needs to be done 
to prove the concept. The Automatic Mirror 
Furnace is part of the payload of the European 
Retrievable Carrier (EURECA) spacecraft, which 
was launched in July 1992. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recently-introduced technique, of transmitting 
spacecraft telemetry (TM) to the ground in the 
form of packets, introduces new problems of 
processing the data to provide the operations 
engineer with an accurate view of evolving 
spacecraft status. 
The older TDM telemetry delivered regularly- 
sampled data in a fixed "TM format" structure, 
which itself gave a good approximation to 
successively sampled "snapshots" of spacecraft 
state; for most practical purposes, the operations 
engineer had only to display data on a format-by- 
format basis to understand what the spacecraft was 
doing. 
different packets out of chronological sequence 
(with respect to the timing of the events which they 
report). The principle is to deliver data from 
individual subsystems, only as fast as is needed to 
track how their status is changing. This means that 
the spacecraft designer can report a wider range of 
information for a given downlink capacity, 
compared to what TDM telemetry allows, but it 
also makes the processing on the ground more 
complex. 
Most current ground-based Spacecraft Control 
Systems (SCS), which handle packetized TM, 
maintain a kind of "pseudo format" (PF) in 
computer memory by recording the latest values of"  
TM data received, from whatever packets contained 
them. Although this means that changes to the PF 
occur irregularly, it gives an acceptable picture of 
the evolution of the spacecraft state over time, so 
long as the updated values in the TM arrive at the 
SCS in true chronological sequence. But when 
different packets report data out of sequence, or 
when "on-off" event report packets become lost in 
transmission, the PF will be inconsistent with the 
spacecraft. 
Limit checking on TM parameters is usually 
performed by the SCS on the basis that the 
operating mode of each on-board subsystem can be 
derived simply from status information in the 
current TM format or PF, and that in most cases, 
a fixed set of limits can validly be associated with 
each such mode. This paradigm works well 
enough given a steady state of the spacecraft, 
although it often produces spurious limit alarms 
during sequences of state changes when switching 
from one operating mode to another. Spurious 
alarms will also occur if the PF adopts inconsistent 
states as described above. 
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spacecraft control is transmitted in true 
chronological sequence. ESA has defined 
standards which aim to promote such good 
(considerate ?) design, but historically, there has 
often been a tendency to make compromises in the 
spacecraft design which push problems of operation 
onto the ground segment. It should however be 
recognised, that increasing the complexity of the 
operations engineer's task in undemtanding what 
the spacecraft is doing, also increases the risk of 
not meeting mission goals; the operations engineen 
and technicians have to work reliably, day in and 
day out, over a period of years. 
Mission operations also become more problematic 
for the ground segment when dealing with a 
spacecraft which does not continuously supply 
telemetry in near real-time, as for example a near- 
earth orbiter like EURECA (which itself uses 
packet TM). Typically these spacecraft have a 
ground station coverage (visibility from the station) 
of only about 10% of an orbit period of about 90 
minutes. TM data are recorded on-board, and 
dumped at high speed over the ground station, in 
parallel with a "real-time" stream to give the 
operations engineer a "quick look" at the spacecraft 
status. 
Such low-coverage science missions may have a 
high degree of on-board autonomy, performing 
complex measurement sequences. They are 
controlled during each orbit by an on-board Master 
Schedule of commands, previously uplinked from 
the ground. The operations engineer must largely 
rely on the autonomous functions, and can make 
only a few checks on the state of the spacecraft as 
it passes over the ground station, taking account 
account of the last known state of the spacecraft 
and of the Master Schedule commands which 
should have been executed during the last orbit. 
The SCS maintains a display of the Master 
Schedule, and verifies execution of as many of the 
commands as possible, mainly by checking defiied 
"verification parameters" in the real-time TM. It 
also perfoms mode-based limit-checking on the 
latest values in the TM format or PF, as described 
above. 
be essential not to take precipitate action when 
these occur. The operations engineer thus will 
have no choice but to rely heavily on the on-board 
safety mechanisms to act correctly when real 
failures ocalr. 
2. APPLICABILITY OF MODELLING 
The actions of the spacecraft operations engineer 
are in effect dependent on the his view of the state 
of the spacecraft at any moment, and on the need 
to act (eg command changes of mode), but 
respecting defined preconditions. 
If the picture given by the PF ("pseudo format") 
contains inconsistencies, the operator will have to 
relate what he sees there to a mental image of what 
the spacecraft should be doing, and try to reconcile 
the two. He will also find himself having to 
predict the evolution of spacecraft status in the case 
of a low-coverage mission with high on-board 
autonomy, whether the telemetry is actually 
packetised or not, at times when the spacecraft is 
out of contact with the ground station. 
In effect, the operator will have in mind a model of 
spacecraft, so why should we not help him by 
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be, at times when it is out of contact with the 
ground station. The model can include functions to 
accept and correctly emulate the spacecraft's 
handling of telecommands, both direct, and via a 
Master Schedule if the mission uses one. Fig 1 
shows the proposed concept. 
Classical "limit checking" in the SCS would then 
be replaced by a process of "discrepancy 
resolution", where discrepancies between the model 
state and the arriving TM data would be resolved 
by a knowledge-based reasoning process. Only if 
the TM data and the model were found really to be 
inconsistent, would out-of-limit alarms be raised to 
the operator, together with a possible diagnosis of 
the cause. Reconciliation of the model with the 
TM could be achieved by adjusting the model state 
according to the diagnosis, either automatically (in 
cases where the diagnosis is known to be reliable), 
or under operator control. In the rare case where 
a TM parameter is judged to have become 
unreliable, it would be permanently flagged as such 
in the discrepancy resolver. 
To perform telecommand verification, the model 
would correctly predict the related TM changes, 
and any which did not OCCUT would be picked up 
by the discrepancy resolver. The SCS should 
continue to keep a log of the execution of all 
telecommands. 
The spacecraft history required for near-real-time 
evaluation and control would be represented by 
regularly recording the state of the model (with 
simple data compression if deemed necessary). 
Intermediate states at any moment of time could be 
obtained by extrapolating (modelling) forwards in 
time, but taking account of adjustments which were 
made from time to time by the discrepancy 
resolver. 
All raw TM data useful for spacecraft control 
should also be filed, such that it can be used in 
long-term spacecraft performance evaluation, and 
for investigating and correcting possible 
deficiencies in the model, All payload data would 
continue to be processed andor and delivered to 
end-users as is done at present. 
3. YS S 
Automatic Mirror Furnace (AMF) payload 
subsystem of the EURECA spacecraft has been 
developed, and integrated with a TC schedule 
handler, a TM tracker, a discrepancy detector and 
a diagnosis module. Fig 2 shows the architecture 
of this AMFESYS ("AMF Expert System") 
prototype, which is implemented on a Sun 
SPARC 2 workstation using the C-based object- 
oriented-programming tool ProKappa (Intellicorp). 
The AMF is one of the most complex of the 
EURECA payloads, although much of the 
complexity is effectively hidden from the spacecraft 
controller because of the high degree of autonomy 
afforded by its embedded microcontroller. The 
scientific purpose of the AMF is to make 
experiments in the growth of crystal structures 
under micro-gravity conditions. The AMF oven 
comprises an ellipsoid mirror with a hole in the 
shell at each end of the major axis. One of 7 
available halogen lamps is inserted through one 
hole, such that it radiates from that focus of the 
status tracker 
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Fig 2: AMFESYS Architecture 
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programmable rates through a cooled neck around 
the hole in the oven shell. 
on a "1 
of the 
transports them around and over the oven insertion 
bole. The lamps are driven in and out of the hole 
by a motor mechanism. The 24 samples, some of 
which are actually calibration probes, are stored on 
a similar disk at the other end of the oven, and are 
moved in and out of the oven by a motor 
mechanism which can also rotate them on their 
own axis. 
Essentially, by monitoring temperatures and other 
information from along the sample, its holder, the 
cooling system and the oven shell, it is possible to 
gain an insight into the growth process (which is 
not simulated by AMFESYS !). 
The AMFESYS model can simulate all operating 
cycles of the AMF as a function of time, and of the 
appropriate input telecommands which configure 
and program those cycles. The model simulates 
the status of all the mechanisms, and emulates the 
processing and measurement cycle control being 
done by the AMF microprocessor. The input of the 
required telecommands for any desired 
demonstration test case is effected by feeding to the 
AMFESYS model a stream of time-tagged TC 
history records which it interprets as a schedule of 
commands for execution at the stated times. This 
thus emulates the reception, by the real AMF, of 
commands from the EURECA On Board Data 
Handling System (OBDH) which processes the on- 
board TC Master Schedule. On the other "side", 
the AMFESYS TM tracker inputs a (history) 
stream of corresponding AMF housekeeping TM 
packets, using the packet time stamps to 
synckuonise the handling of these TM packets with 
the currently-simulated time of the model. The 
model time for any test run is therefore set up to 
run through the time period covered by the 
corraponding TM and TC history streams. 
The discrepancy detector module tries to deal with 
discrepancies between the TM parameter values, 
and the state of the model, either by ignoring them 
result in the conclusion that a malfunction of some 
kind has occurred. 
diagnosis to the 
corresponding "forced" change to the status or 
performance of the model, to correspond to the 
malfunction. The operator may accept the 
diagnosis and authorise the change to the model, or 
simply reject it, in which case AMFESYS will 
most likely throw it up again within a short time, 
or he may change the model himself because he 
decides that his diagnosis is the true one. 
One could claim (although many would disagree) 
that the ability of the diagnoser to force changes to 
the model under the supervision of the operator, 
and in particular those changes which affect 
subsequent performance of the model (such as 
marking certain components as ''failed"), 
constitutes a primitive form of adaptive "learning" 
about degradations of the real AMF, under the 
guidance of the operator. This is a little analogous 
to a pupil who says to his teacher (AMF engineer) 
"I think that motor1 has failed, don't you ?I' to 
which the teacher will either agree, or supply his 
own better judgement. 
Either AMFESYS will "learn" about degradations 
in the M, by recording them in its model under 
the operator's supervision, or the operator can 
impose the new knowledge directly. An "OK" 
status slot is defiied for the general class AMF 
devices which is the parent of all AMF hardware 
object subclasses (eg switch, motor, spindle, gear, 
storage disk.. .) . It is thus particularly easy to "fail" 
any object via the ProKappa Object Ekowser. 
However, it is only sensible to do this where there 
an object method which can use this information, 
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or a corresponding diagnostic rule to detect the 
failure. 
e and adapt its mode1 to 
1: on-defective sample end-position switch 
2: 
3: spare lamp defective 
4: sample code unreadable 
5: wrongly-coded sample 
6: lamp code unreadable 
defective sample position sensor pot 
In the real AMF, all of ,these failures result in 
some sort of attempt by the AMF microcontroller 
to circumvent the problem, and an "exception 
packet" will eventually be emitted in the TM. 
AMFESYS can however already detect and 
correctly diagnose these anomolies from the 
housekeeping TM alone; in fact it does not use 
report or exception packets yet, although there are 
plans under consideration to make it do so. 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The study was completed in March 1992, and the 
results demonstrate the feasibility of using a model 
as the basic reference for TM parameter limit 
checking, combined with automatic reasoning about 
the discrepancies, and adjustment of the model state 
under operator control. The available funding has 
restricted the study to demonstrate the technique for 
only one spacerraft subsystem, but nevertheless the 
A M F  is a complex device, and entirely suitable as 
a "test case" for this type of experimentation. 
As part of the task demonstrating the viability of 
the proposed approach to spacecraft control, an 
analysis was made of what monitoring facilities the 
user interface of such a system should give to the 
operator. The AMF'ESYS was provided with a 
user interface which not only shows him the 
evolving state of the model, but also a seperate 
display showing the comparison between the 
incoming TM values, and the corresponding values 
derived from the model state. It is thought that the 
operator would normally use just the model status 
display; the "TM comparator display" would be 
useful when an anomoly occurs, especially during 
the early lifetime of the model when the users 
might be rather sceptical of the system's ability to 
handle all operating conditions. The techniques 
proposed here will need extensive validation in an 
Fig 3:  User Interface 
environment which represents as closely as possible 
the real operational world. 
The work of the study described above now needs 
to be extended further, to investigate the problems 
which may OCCUT in extending the scope of the 
concept, eg to a range of spacecraft subsystems, in 
handling historical information, in coping with loss 
of TM packets, and in handling the non- 
chronological arrival of TM information. 
AMFESYS also seems to be a potentially good 
starting-point to develop the concept further by 
doing some experiments in model-based 
hypothetical reasoning, because of its architecture, 
and also since ProKappa allows the dynamic 
definition and instantiation of new rules and object 
classes. 
Work needs to be done to set guidelines for the 
approach to the design and implementation of the 
models, as well as on the question of how to 
accommodate such models within the hardware and 
software infrastructure of future SCS. ESOG's 
experience over the last 20 years, in developing 
and using full spacecraft system simulators for 
ground system and procedures checkout and for 
operator training, provides a solid foundation for a 
methodology for the development of models 
integral with future SCS. However, it is important 
to keep seperate the development of intra-SCS 
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The use of models in SCS is a technique which can 
be in t rodud  gradually, first concentrating on 
spacecraft subsystems or functions whose behaviour 
is simple to model. For every additional subsystem 
whose TM housekeeping data can be monitored 
using the model paradigm, there will be a 
corresponding improvement in the operations 
engineer's understanding of what the spacecraft is 
doing. This will allow him to concentrate his 
attention on events that really matter, and so reduce 
the risk of human error in operations. 
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